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A Paradigm from Securities Law of
Uninformed Supreme Court Decisionmaking
Larry D. Soderquist*
I. Introduction
Supreme Court Justices rarely are experts in the highly specialized and
difficult areas of law that have at their cores statutes administered by federal
agencies. Securities law is one of these areas, and I will use it as a paradigm
for the problems that result from Supreme Court decisionmaking by Justices
who are uninformed about the law governing the specific issues of a case or
about the general area of law out of which the issues grew.' Securities law
cannot be understood on one's own. "[I]t is a puzzle that can be put together
in many ways that look right, but only one of them is."'2 In this situation,
uninformed decisionmaking translates to wrong decisionmaking, for unless,
one knows what the whole puzzle looks like when put together, it is virtually
impossible to decide correctly what to do with an individual piece.
The adversarial process might reasonably be expected to solve this prob-
lem, but too often it does not, probably for three reasons. First, Justices know
that they will not get, and should not get, an unbiased view from advocates.
Second, a general knowledge of how a particular securities law issue fits into
the structure of securities law is not usually provided by the adversarial
process, which almost always focuses simply on specific issues. Third, most
securities law cases are argued by general business litigators who rarely are
securities law specialists.3 Good litigators will, of course, try to become
* Professor of Law and Director, Corporate and Securities Law Institute, Vanderbilt
University, Joseph Flom Visiting Professor of Law and Business, Harvard University (Fall
1999). I wish to thank my research assistants, Karen Jordan and Arina Lekhel, for their helpful
work on this essay.
1. The only Justice who stands out as a securities law expert is William 0. Douglas.
During 1936 and part of 1937 he was a member of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
and he served as its chairman until he joined the Supreme Court in 1939. DoUGLAS OF THBE
SUPpE1IE CoURT 12,14 (Veto Countryman ed., 1959).
2. LARPYD.SODERQUiST,UNDERSTANDiNGTHESEcuRrrE LAWS § 1.1 (3ded. 1993,
Supp. 1999).
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1974), and Rule lOb-5,
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1999), underthatAct provide exceptions. Cases involving one ofthose
provisions often are handled by experts on the provision.
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experts in the area of securities law involved in a case, but the problem they
face is the one mentioned above: they cannot truly understand one part of,
say, the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act),4 without a knowledge of the
Act as a whole.
If the adversarial process does not solve the problem, one might hope that
the amicus briefs that frequently are filed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (Commission) would. It is likely that such briefs have prevented
problems in decisionmaking, but since these problems did not occur, observers
have no -way of accessing how often a Commission brief has prevented a
problem. What we do know from decided cases is that amicus briefs have not
come close to solving the problem of uninformed decisionmaking, likely
because the Commission properly has its own agenda and is viewed by
Justices as essentially an extra advocate for one side or the other.
After discussing a sample of securities law cases where uninformed
decisionmaking has been a problem in the Supreme Court, I will propose a
solution. In doing so I am mindful that one should not lightly tamper with an
institution that generally has worked well since the country's founding. On
the other hand, it should not be surprising that some tinkering is necessary to
fix a process devised two centuries ago by people who had no inkling of the
legal complexities that would accompany the rise of the modem regulatory
state. The secret is to tinker only to the extent essential, and to tinker in a way
that is controlled by the Justices of the Court, so that the Justices can guide the
process as they think best.
ff. Examples of Uninformed Supreme Court Decisionmaking
in Securities Law
The first examples of uninformed Supreme Court decisionmaking in
securities law that I will discuss are from an area that is easiest for non-
experts to deal with, since it involves the Supreme Court's own interpretation
of the statutory definition of a security. In this area the Commission has not
made rules, put out general interpretive releases, or otherwise intruded much
into the area. Even so, the Court's uninformed decisionmaking itself has been
a problem. What is worse, one of its decisions on the definition of a security
has led to a serious problem in a later case where the Court confronted an
issue deeply involved in rules, regulations, interpretations, and decisions by
the Commission sitting in its quasi-judicial capacity. I will discuss that case
at the end of this section.
The case to examine first on the issue of what is a security occurred in
the 1940s after a company in Florida offered guests at its hotel the chance to
purchase pieces of an orange grove, and a sister company offered the guests
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994 & Supp. 11997).
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management contracts under which all aspects of the growing and selling of
the oranges would be handled by that company.' At the end of the harvest,
any profits would be distributed according to the percentage ofthe grove held
by each landowner.6 The Commission sued the companies involved, saying
they were offering a security called an investment contract (which is a security
never encountered in that name; rather the concept of an investment contract
is a legal construct used to pull various investment schemes under the cover-
age of the securities laws).' The issue reached the Supreme Court in SEC v.
W. J Howey Co.' In Howey the Court set out its test for an investment con-
tract, saying: "The test is whether the scheme involves an investment ofmoney
in a common enterprise with [the expectation of] profits to come solely from
the efforts of others."9
The Howey test still stands today, though as will be seen, what it actually
now requires has been clouded by more recent decisions of the Supreme
Court. More important, some later Supreme Court decisions involving the test
easily can mislead non-experts as to what is a security because the Court's
analysis does not fit within the well-developed interpretive structure of the
securities laws, but instead appears to be sui generis.
An example is United Housing Foundation v. Forman."0 Forman in-
volved a housing cooperative, incorporated under a special New York statute,
that offered shares of stock in the cooperative." These shares entitled the
owner to secure an apartment owned by the cooperative.1 2 The most interest-
ing aspect of the Supreme Court's decision relates to the "expectation of
profits" element of the Howey test. 3 No profit could be made on the sale of
the stock because, under the New York statute, the stock could not be sold for
more than its original price. 4 However, significant space in the cooperative's
buildings was leased to commercial interests, such as stores and laundries, and
5. See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293,295 (1946) (holding Howey liable for
unregistered offering of security).
6. Id. at 296.
7. "Investment contract" is one of the securities listed in the definition of "security"
found in Securities Act § 2(aX1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(aX1) (Supp. 1 1997).
8. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
9. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 301. The Court found that the test was met and that the
Howey companies had unlawfully offered securities, in that the securities had not been regis-
tered with the Commission and neither did the companies have available an exemption from the
registration requirement of Securities Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e. Id.
10. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
11. United Housing Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 840-41 (1975).
12. Id. at842.
13. Id. at 845.
14. Id. at 842-43.
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the lease income could be traced directly to lower monthly maintenance
payments on the apartments." The plaintiffs argued that this satisfied the
"expectation of profits" element. The Supreme Court disagreed, saying that
this was "far too speculative and insubstantial to bring the entire transaction
within the Securities Acts." '16
This statement, and the general tenor of the opinion, are misleading to
those uninitiated in securities law. They may well read the case as a blueprint
for establishing an investment scheme that skirts the definition of "investment
contract." In fact, doing that easily could trigger an enforcement action by the
Commission, and the Commission would not care if some element of the
Howey test were "insubstantial." Forman was decided the way it was because
it did not involve an investment scheme, and the Court properly did not want
to find that the case involved a security. The problem is that the Court did not
appreciate that what it said in its decision could create mischief and misfortune.
Forman also leads to confusion aboutthe Supreme Court's understanding
of the "solely from the efforts of others" part of the Howey test. In Forman
the Court reaffirmed the Howey test but then restated it differently, saying that
the "touchstone is the presence of an investment in a common venture pre-
mised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepre-
neurial or managerial efforts of others."" The switch from "solely from the
efforts of others" to "the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others" came
from a Ninth Circuit case, SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.'1 That
case involved a pyramid scheme that the Ninth Circuit clearly wanted to pull
within the concept of an investment contract so the Commission could take
action against those behind the scheme.19
If the Forman opinion stopped with its quotation from Glenn W Turner,
it would be understandable on this point. The opinion would, of course, be
read to indicate that the Supreme Court was putting its imprimatur on the
change away from "solely." In a curious footnote appearing on the same page,
however, the Court said it "expressed no view" on the Ninth Circuit's holding
in Glenn W. Turner that "solely" should be read flexibly rather than literally.20
This makes opaque what the Supreme Court meant to say on the subject and
15. Id. at 856.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 852.
18. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
19. See SEC v. Glen W. Turner Enters. Inc., 474 F.2d 476,482-83 (9th Cir. 1973) (inter-
preting term investment contract to reach pyramid scheme). The problem under a straight-
forward reading of the Howey test is, of course, that the "investors" in a pyramid scheme are
deeply involved in the scheme, mostly by bringing friends and neighbors to meetings run by the
promoters of the scheme. Thus, profits are not to come "solely from the efforts of others."
20. United Housing Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,852 n.16 (1975).
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leaves one to suspect that the Court did not know the way through the thicket
in which it was ensnared.
Yet another example of uninformed Supreme Court decisionmaking is
InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel.2 1 Inthis case the Courthad
to determine whether an investment contract was involved when employers,
under a collective bargaining agreement, made contributions into a pension
fund that was non-contributory onthe part of employees.' Again the Court did
not want to find that a security existed, partly because pensions had recently
been subjected to extensive federal regulation under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 197 4 .' And again the way the Court treated the issue
of whether a security existed could only lead non-experts into problems. The
two best examples of such problems are the Court's handling of the "invest-
ment of money" and the "expectation of profits" elements ofthe Howey test.
It has always been understood that under Howey actual "money" need not
be invested, but rather any consideration will do, and the Court in Daniel
properly did not even mention the fact that the Teamster members were not
alleged to be investing money, but rather labor.24 In finding the "investment"
element missing, however, the Court merely said cursorily that "it seems clear
that an employee is selling his labor primarily to obtain a livelihood, not
making an investment."'  Although this is true, fringe benefits obviously are
a significant form of compensation, so by use of the word "primarily" the
Court can be said to have found that the employees were, in a not insignificant
part, selling their labor as an investment in their pensions, which logically
should meet the requirement of Howey. The Court, without discussion, did
not find this to be so.
Daniel is also important in its handling of the "expectation of profits"
element of the Howey test. In determining that this element was missing in
Daniel, the Court based its decision on the fact that a relatively small portion
of the Teamsters' pension fund had come from profits on the investment of
contributions, with most of the fund having been derived from the contribu-
tions themselves. 6 This analysis is entirely at odds with securities law since
the actual outcome of a scheme has nothing to do with whether a security
exists. In fact, in most securities litigation investors have lost money.
21. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
22. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551,553 (1979).
23. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994);
see Daniel, 439 U.S. at 569-70 (discussing influence of ERISA on security analysis).
24. See Daniel, 439 U.S. at 559 (discussing contribution of labor in context of "invest-
ment and money").
25. Id. at 560.
26. See id. at 562 (during twenty-two year period fund earned $31,000,000, while em-
ployee contributions totaled $153,000,000).
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As with Forman, the Daniel decision easily can lead non-experts to
believe that they can create an investment vehicle under protective cover
provided by the Supreme Court. But ifthey tried, they quickly would find the
hoped-for cover to be pervious. The way for the Court to have avoided this
problem, and much casuistry,27 would have been to decide Forman and Daniel
by reference to the lead-in language to the definitions in the Securities Act.
This language provides that the defined terms have the stated meanings "unless
the context otherwise requires."' Then, the Court could have found that in
the contexts of these cases no security existed." This idea leads to two cases
in which the Court did decide a "what is a security" issue by reference to the
"unless the context otherwise requires" proviso.
One is Reves v. Ernst & Young,3" which involved the issue of whether
promissory notes issued by a farmers' cooperative were securities.31 "Note"
is the first item listed in the Securities Act's definition of a security,32 yet
not all notes are securities. The Commission and the courts have long found
some kinds of notes to be securities and others not to be. The issue has been
how to decide in which category to put a particular note. Most courts had
used the "commercial-investment dichotomy, ' 33 under which notes found to
be commercial notes were not securities because the context required that
27. I use the term in a non-pejorative sense. I do not blame the Justices or clerks of the
Supreme Court for their mistaken understanding of securities law. As indicated at the beginning
of this essay, securities law cannot be learned on one's own and is tricky in that it may seem that
one has come to a correct conclusion because the conclusion flowed from diligent work and is
logical. All the Supreme Court cases discussed in this essay show both diligence and logical
legal reasoning. The problems in the syllogisms of the Court's reasoning were not in the con-
clusions but in the premises.
28. Securities Act § 2(aX1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(aXI) (Supp. 1 1997).
29. At one time there was a controversy about whether the context referred to in the lead-
in to the definitions included the transactional context or was merely the linguistic context in
the Securities Act, but it now is clear that both contexts are relevant See Irving P. Seldin, When
StockIs Not a Security: The Sale ofBusiness Doctrine Under the Federal Securities Laws, 37
Bus. LAW. 637, 669 n.79 (1982) (gathering materials concerning lead-in language to definition
section of Securities Act).
30. 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
31. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 58 (1990) (adopting family resemblance
test and holding demand note in this case to be security).
32. Securities Act § 2(aX1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(aXl) (Supp. 1111997).
33. See, e.g., Holloway v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 900 F.2d 1485,1487 (10th Cir.
1990) (using two-part approach based on "investment versus commercial" intent for determining
when note is security prior to Reves), cert denied sub nom. KPMG Peat Marwick v. Holloway,
498 U.S. 988 (1990); Futura Dev. Corp. v. Centex Corp., 761 F.2d 33, 40-41 (1st Cir. 1985)
(finding investment/commercial test best); Hunssinger v. Rockford Bus. Credits, Inc., 745 F.2d
484, 488 (7th Cir. 1984) (explaining that both Seventh and Fifth Circuits use commer-
cial/investment test).
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finding.34 When the Supreme Court decided Reves, however, it rejected this
test and adopted instead the family resemblance test devised by the Second
Circuit.
35
The family resemblance test is complicated. It starts with the presump-
tion that a note is a security.36 To see if the presumption should be rebutted,
a court compares the note in question with a list of varieties of notes that the
Second Circuit had found were not securities, the purpose being to determine
if there is a sufficient family resemblance for the note in question to be added
to the list.3  As an aid in making this comparison, the Court set out four
factors to be considered. 8
Two aspects of the Court's adoption and discussion of the family resem-
blance test indicate uninformed decisionmaking. First; the Court did not seem
to understand that, while the test may have worked well in one circuit, it
would inevitably lead to confusion over time as each circuit develops its own
list of which notes are securities and which are not. Also, it appears in
reading the opinion that the Court did not appreciate the subtleties involved
in making the required comparisons.
More importantly, one of the four factors the Court said should be con-
sidered in the required comparison was phrased as follows: 'tWe examine the
'plan of distribution' ofthe instrument... to determine whether it is an instru-
ment in which there is 'common trading for speculation or investment.' 3 9 At
the same time, the Court noted that common trading does not require actual
trading.4° All this is impossible to understand, and one gets the impression
that the failure of understanding comes from a failure of the Court to know
how notes of various sorts are used in commerce and what effect this should
have on securities law. The Reves Court focused on notes designed for
trading in financial markets, failing to realize that a great many notes that are
inarguably securities never leave the hands of one party and, more impor-
tantly, are not designed to do so. With this in mind, it is virtually impossible
to know how to apply the "plan and distribution" factor in making the Court's
required testing of family resemblance.
34. As the terms imply, a commercial note is basically one that grows naturally out of a
commercial transaction and is not made primarily for the purpose of return on investment, and
an investment note is essentially one that is made for the purpose of such a return.
35. Reves, 494 U.S. at 64-65.
36. Id. at 67.
37. Id. at 63-64.
38. See id. at 66-67 (enumerating four factors to be considered: (1) motivations of parties,
(2) plan of distribution, (3) reasonable expectations of investing public, and (4) other factors
that may reduce risk of investment).
39. Id. at 66.
40. Id.
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The other case to look at under the rubric of "unless the context other-
wise requires" is Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth.41 This case involved the
issue of whether common stock in a business corporation is a security when
the context is a sale of a business by means of selling all or most of the out-
standing stock of the corporation that serves as the vehicle for the business.42
At first thought it may seem impossible to conclude that common stock in
a business corporation is not a security. It is, of course, the classic security.
Butto find common stock to be a security inthis situation sets up a disturbing
anomaly. When a business is being sold, the form the transaction is to take (for
example, sale of stock, sale of assets, or merger) is almost entirely a technical
decision made by the parties' lawyers and accountants. The primary issue for
the parties is price; the issues for their lawyers and accountants are taxes and
liability. Note, however, the incredible difference to the parties if stock is, in
such a situation, a security. Hundreds of years of development of the law of
contracts and fraud, which otherwise would tell the parties what they must
disclose to each other, are swept aside and the "full disclosure" philosophy of
the securities laws is substituted without a judicial decision having been made
that this substitution makes real-world sense or advances justice.
In Landreth, the Court did not discuss how the securities law obligations
of the seller could be met.43 Nor did the Court appear to understand the
import of the anomaly it created. Rather, the Court seemed simply to make
its decision based on a literal view that stock is stock is stock, period, without
exception, for no reason other than that common stock is the classic security.
The opinion shows an uninformed view of what the full obligations of the
securities laws entail. Landreth is important for that perspective, but it is
more important in setting the stage for the Supreme Court case that best shows
the uninformed nature of Supreme Court decisionmaking in securities law and
the dangers that flow from that decisionmaking.
The case is Gustafson v. Alloyd Co." Unlike the cases discussed above,
which involved only the analysis of a definition in the Securities Act, Gustaf-
son threw the Court into the heart of some of the most complex and tricky
areas of the Act. These areas are characterized by rulemaking, the issuance
of interpretive and policy releases, Commission decisionmaking in its quasi-
judicial capacity, opinions by lawyers at the Commission, and informal under-
standings which came about as a result of decades of interactions between the
Commission's staff and securities lawyers. The Supreme Court was working
beyond its competence and did not know it, the decision having been based
41. 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
42. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681,683 (1985) (presenting question
of whether sale of all stock of company is security subject to Securities Act).
43. See generaltyLandreth, 471 U.S. 681.
44. 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
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on what appears to be almost a complete misunderstanding of the Securities
Act. This being true, what otherwise would be rational and cogent discussions
become gibberish.
The case involved the same essential facts as Landreth: the sale of a
business by means of the sale of substantially all the stock of the business's
corporate vehicle.4" It is easy to speculate that part of the reason for bad
decisionmaking in Gustafson was that the Court when faced with a case to
decide, was not satisfied with the idea, arrived at with seeming ease in
Landreth, that the securities laws apply in these situations.
In any event, in connection with the sale in Gustafson, the parties signed
a purchase agreement that contained typical representations, warranties, and
covenants.46 After the purchase, some of the buyers became unhappy with the
transaction and sued the sellers under Securities Act Section 12(a)(2), which
provides a private remedy when someone sells a security "by means of a
prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a
material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading.... " The buyers alleged that the sellers had made material mis-
statements in the purchase agreement and demanded rescission, as is provided
in this section.48
In analyzing Section 12(a)(2), the Court chose to focus its discussion on
the term "prospectus." It held that the term refers to a document of wide
dissemination that is used in selling securities in public offerings not in private
sales ofsecurities.49 Therefore, according to the Court, the purchase agreement
in Gustafson could not be a prospectus. Speaking to congressional intent, the
Court specifically found that "[t]he intent of Congress and the design of the
statute require that § [12(a)(2)] liability be limited to public offerings."5"
None of this fits within the accepted construct of securities law, and a
traditional critique of the case is useless since its conclusions are based on a
misunderstanding ofthe underlying law. The most pointedly telling statement
in the opinionthat shows the Court's lack ofunderstanding is this: "Section 11
provides for liability on account of false registration statements; § [12(a)(2)]
for liability based on misstatements in prospectuses.""1 From this statement,
45. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
46. Id. at 565-66.
47. Securities Act of 1933,15 U.S.C. § 777(aX2) (Supp. 1111997).
48. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 566.
49. See id. at 575-76 (discussing congressional intent and legal definition of term "pro-
spectus").
50. Id. at 578.
51. Id. at571.
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it is clear that the Court believed that the prospectus used in a public offering
is one thing and the registration statement quite something else.
The problem is that the Court did not know how to read the Securities
Act. An untutored reading of Securities Act Section 10,52 which gives the
requirements for a prospectus that meets the provisions of the Act, can lead
to a belief by the uninfored that first a registration statement is prepared and
then a prospectus is drafted based on information in the registration state-
ment. 3 The fact is, this is exactly backwards. First, a prospectus is drafted
containing all the information intended for investors, then a registration state-
ment is created by adding a cover page at the front and a few innocuous pages
at the back. The added pages contain such items as a list of the costs to be
incurred in the offering, a consent by the accountants to have their audit
opinion appear in the prospectus, and signatures of various parties.5 4
Put simply, there never has been and never will be a private lawsuit
brought for disclosure problems in the non-prospectus part of a registration
statement. Thus, the Court has read Section 1115 (a long and detailed provi-
sion relating to private rights of action for disclosure problems in registration
statements) and Section 12(a)(2) to cover the same problems. This could not
have been, by any stretch, what the drafters envisioned. Neither could it have
been what the Court would have desired if it had been informed enough to
read Section 10 correctly.
Further, it is impossible to postulate a legislative intent that
Section 12(a)(2) applies only to public offerings. Companies collectively do
thousands of non-public offerings for every public offering.56 This being the
case, it is inconceivable that Congress meant to have two provisions giving
securities purchasers a private right of action in public offerings (one Section
11, which works out the rules for liability in exquisite detail, and the other
52. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1994).
53. Section 10(a) says that "a prospectus... shall contain the information contained in
the registration statement [with specified exceptions]." Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77j(aX1).
54. Sometimes financial schedules are added, but they relate to the financial statements
in the prospectus, and it would be almost impossible for a schedule to contain a disclosure
problem that did not appear in a more important way in the financial statements themselves.
55. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (outlining civil liability for false state-
ments in registration material).
56. This is easily understood simply based on the costs of a public offering registered
under the Securities Act In a registered offering of a first-time registrant of, say, $5 million
of securities, the compensation to the securities firms that sell to the public will be approxi-
mately $500,000, and legal and accounting fees, along with printing expenses, likely will come
to another $500,000. In using the terms "public offerings" and "non-public offerings," this
essay assumes that the offerings are legal. This will become important when discussing the
liability provisions of the Act
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Section 12(a)(2), which would then be essentially a short and unnecessary
appendage). It is even less conceivable that Congress intended to have in the
Securities Act no provision protecting purchasers in the much more numerous
non-public offerings.
Viewed the way the Commission, the courts, and securities lawyers have
viewed the Securities Act for 62 years, Section 11 focuses on disclosure prob-
lems in registered public offerings, Section 12(a)(2) on disclosure problems
in non-public offerings, and Section 12(a)(1)57 on unlawful public offerings."e
Summarized briefly, there are three types of offerings under the Securities
Act: registered, exempt, and unlawful. And the drafters intended there to be
three provisions to protect private plaintiffs in these offerings: Section 11,
Section 12(a)(2), and Section 12(a)(1).
But this is only part ofthe story ofuninformed decisionmaking in Gustaf-
son, which, it must be remembered, involved a non-public offering. The
Court said in Gustafson that it could not "accept the conclusion that [the term'prospectus'] means one thing in one section of the Act and something quite
different in another." 9 The Court never mentioned the law relating to regis-
tered public offerings and clearly did not appreciate the effect its decision, and
especially this statement, could have in that area. Securities Act Section
2(a)(10) defines the term "prospectus."'e The most basic part of the definition
is that the term "means any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter,
or communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any security
for sale."'" The Commission, courts, and securities lawyers have always
realized that the beginning language just quoted - "means any prospectus" -
refers to the prospectus contained in the registration statement and that the
definition as quoted can be compressed to say that a prospectus is any written
offer.62 This compression is possible, of course, because the term "communi-
cation" encompasses all the items that precede it in the definition.
This understanding of what constitutes a prospectus under securities law
is essential to an understanding of what can and cannot be done during the
various periods of a registered public offering. There are three such periods:
pre-filing (that is, before the registration statement is filed with the Commis-
sion), waiting (after the registration statement is filed), and post-effective
57. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771(aXl) (discussing civil liabilities arising
from sale of securities in violation ofAct).
58. These are unregistered offerings for which no exemption is available.
59. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 573 (1995).
60. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(aX1O) (Supp. I 1997) (defining term
"prospectus").
61. Id. § 77b (aXlO).
62. Setting aside radio and television offers, which are rare.
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(after the registration statement is effective). During the pre-filing period, no
offer of securities may be made, so the issue of what constitutes a prospectus
is irrelevant. During the waiting and post-effective periods, however, it is
critical to know what a prospectus is because that issue determines what
written offers may or may not be made.
Basically, the Securities Act provides in Section 5 that a prospectus
meeting the requirements of Section 10 (which describes the prospectus that
makes up the bulk ofthe registration statement) may be used during the waiting
period and in specified circumstances must be delivered to buyers in the post-
effective period. 3 The Act also provides that during the waiting and post-
effective periods certain limited written offers may be made under exceptions
to the definition of "prospectus."'  Any other written offers are unlawful.
The concept of "offer" is extremely expansive under the Securities Act,
mainly because the Commission has interpreted it to include anything that
conditions the market for securities.6" So, for example, a note by a securities
salesperson to a customer saying "Phone me as soon as possible as my allot-
ment is almost complete on this issue," has been held to constitute a prospec-
tus.' Put simply, ever since 1933 written offers other than by the prospectus
contained in a registration statement have been tightly constrained.
Under the language of Gustafson, however, all this could change if a
court takes Gustafson beyond its holding and applies it to the area of securities
registration. As indicated above,67 the Court in Gustafson said that it could
not "accept the conclusion that [the term 'prospectus'] means one thing in one
section of the Act and something quite different in another." The Court also
said that the term "prospectus" as defined in Section 2(a)(10) refers to docu-
ments of wide distribution," and that "the word 'prospectus' is a term of art
referring to a document that describes a public offering."'69 Under these state-
ments, the law of what can and cannot be done during the course of a public
offering could be thrown out and replaced by the idea that, during the waiting
63. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (b) (1994) (discussing requirements of
prospectus for compliance with section 10).
64. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 2(aX10), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10) (Supp. 1111997)
(defining prospectus and providing criteria for certain communications to be deemed not
prospectuses); Communications Not Deemed a Prospectus, 17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (1999) (setting
forth Rule 134 and excepting certain writings as not prospectuses).
65. See, e.g., Publication of Information Prior to or After the Effective Date ofaRegistra-
tion Statement, Securities Act Release No. 33-3844, 1957 WL 3605 (Oct. 8, 1957) (discussing
SEC application of prospectus regulations).
66. In re Franldin, Meyer & Barnett, 37 S.E.C. 47, 49 (1956) (adjudicating sale of
unregistered securities in violation of Securities Act of 1933).
67. See supra text accompanying note 59 (quoting Supreme Court in Gustafson).
68. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561,575 (1995).
69. Id. at 584.
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and post-effective periods, prospective buyers could be given any kind of
promotional material, so long as it either was not widely distributed or it did
not "describe[ ] a public offering."70
Certainly the Commission would be against these changes, as would most
securities lawyers. The Commission wants to ensure that investors get full and
fair disclosure, and this could not be ensured if securities firms were allowed
to send out all manner of promotional materials during a registered offering.
Securities lawyers would fear the liability that could easily accrue under
Sections 11 or 12(a)(2) because of fhlse or, especially, misleading statements
(realizing here that anything short of full and fair disclosure is likely to strike
a plaintiff's lawyer as at least misleading).
1ff. Proposed Solution to Uninformed Supreme Court Decisionmaking
in Securities Law and Other Specialized Areas
Over the decades there have been a number of proposals to deal with the
problems specialized areas of the law present for the Supreme Court. For
example, Dean Erwin Griswold of Harvard Law School argued in 1944 that
separate courts should be set up to be the final arbiters in certain specialized
areas such as his own field of tax law." Two decades earlier, Felix Frank-
furter and James M. Landis,72 then Harvard Law School professors, reviewed
the history of proposals for change in the Supreme Court up to 1928, saying:
The serious proposals made from time to time to increase the membership
of the Court, to add temporary judges, to break up an enlarged Court into
divisions, did not prevail. There are intrinsic limits to the size of a court
if it is to be a coherent instrument for the dispatch of business and at the
same time to observe the needs of consultation and deliberation.?3
In 1999 Edward Lazarus, in a book giving readers a clerk's-eye-view of the
workings ofthe Supreme Court, tells a story about clerks trying to get Justices
to pay more attention to a particular study relating to the death penalty. 4 In
that instance, he says, several clerks suggested the appointment of a special
70. Id.
71. See Erwin Griswold, The Needfor a Court of TaxAppeals, 57 HARv. L. REv. 1153,
1192 (1944) (discussing confusion arising from judicial misinterpretation of tax principles).
72. Incidentally, both authors were involved in creating the Securities Act, Felix Frank-
furter as the New Deal staff member who put together the three person drafting team of which
James Landis was a member. See James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities
Act of 1933, 28 GEo. WAsH. L. Rav. 29, 33-34 (1959) (documenting personal reflections on
passage of Securities Act of 1933).
73. F xFR. RTE,&JAMESM.LANDIS,THEBUsmiESs OFT-ESuPECOURT 187
(1928).
74. EDWARD LAZARUS, CLoSED CHAMBERS: THEFnRSTEYyEwrrEss AccoUNT OF TBE
Epic STRUGGLES INSI) THE SUPREmE COURT (1999).
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master," which has been the Court's response when faced with border dis-
putes between states, an area over which it has original jurisdiction.76
The problem with the aforementioned proposals is that they are too
drastic; they give up too much of the system that has proven mostly to have
worked and replace it with one having uncertain results. The historical
proposal that would be most desirable is the establishment of specialized
courts that would hear appeals from the various circuit courts of appeals. An
alternative, of course, would be simply to have specialized courts of appeal,
but allowing just one appeal would drastically alter the system for the devel-
opment of law now in existence. There is much value in the current system,
whereby circuit courts often come up with different judicial solutions until a
conflict in the circuits is ripe for resolution in the Supreme Court. At the
same time, having a securities supreme court, a tax supreme court, and so on
(by whatever name) has a certain appeal. For one thing, it would solve the
major problem discussed in this essay, since each such court would be com-
prised of experts. The results of establishing such courts are impossible to
predict with accuracy. One can, however, postulate some of them.
One effect would be that federal agencies such as the Commission would
be paid less deference than they now enjoy, not only by the specialized courts,
but by all courts. This may not be bad, but it is impossible to tell. Certainly,
at present, courts do pay deference to the Conunission, and one does not hear
complaints that courts pay the Conmmission too much deference. There is,
therefore, reason to believe that the current system has thatbalance about right.
Another effect would be that the Supreme Court would hear more general
subject matter cases, because of the burdens lifted from it. There would also
be many more securities, tax, and other specialized cases heard by a court of
final jurisdiction. Currently, for example, the Supreme Court decides few
securities cases. With a specialized securities court taking a full docket from
the various circuits, that number would increase by perhaps a hundred times.
At an initial glance this may all seem to be beneficial, but whether it would be
is another question.
First of all, under the current system we have a relatively unitary judicial
and social philosophy emanating from the Supreme Court during a particular
period. With specialized "supreme" courts promulgating decisions along with
the current Court, one would expect divergences injudicial and social philoso-
phy that have essentially nothing to do with the subject matter of the cases.
Exactly how that would affect American society is hard to say, but the effect
is more likely to be bad than good.
75. See id. at 202 (discussing Court's ideological resistance to appointment of special
master).
76. U.S. CoNsT. art. E, § 2, cl. 1.
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Second, cases would be heard by a "supreme" court before the relevant
law has had as much time to develop in the various circuits as it does cur-
rently. This is an unhappy result, since there is not any widely held beliefthat
circuit splits in important areas are waiting unduly long to be resolved, and
there are clear benefits in allowing judicial experimentation to run its full
course in the circuit courts.
Third, it likely would not be entirely beneficial if there were less varia-
tion among the circuits. It is probably a good thing that the law relating
to, say, Federal Trade Commission matters, be allowed to differ from circuit
to circuit, since judges can be expected to have a better sense of the pre-
vailing social policy desires in their circuits than can Justices sitting in Wash-
ington.
Fourth, litigation costs would increase since more litigants would be able
to make good their pledge to "take it all the way to the Supreme Court." Since
the outcome of most of the "extra" appeals could be predicted fairly well,
additional litigation would not be worth the money and the attendant upheaval
that flows from litigation.
Finally, it is impossible to justify jurisprudentially the fact that a "su-
preme" court resolution would be much more available to litigants with cases
involving specialized areas of law than it would be to all other litigants. It
would provide grossly unequal access to justice if, for example, nine Justices
devoted their efforts to securities law, nine to tax law, and the current nine to
everything else.
As stated at the end of Part I above, the secret to solving the problem of
uninformed Supreme Court decisionmaking is to tinker only to the extent
essential, and to tinker in a way that is controlled by the Justices of the Court,
so that the Justices can guide the process as they think best. With this in
mind, I propose that the Court appoint what I would call counsels. These
counsels would do some of the work now done by law clerks. The big differ-
ences would be that counsels (i) would be experts in a particular area in which
the Court thought it could use assistance, (ii) would work only on a case by
case basis, and (iii) would be appointed to serve the Court in general, rather
than assigned to a single Justice.
The Court would choose experts in various areas, some ahead of time and
some as the need arose, name each a "Counsel to the Supreme Court," and call
on them as the Court wished in particular cases. Obviously the persons
chosen would need to have certain qualities beyond expertise in a specialized
area. They would have to be able to give the Court unbiased opinions, and
they would need the confidence of the Justices. I would contemplate that any
particular counsel would serve only on occasion, though obviously some
would impress the Court to the extent that their services would be asked for
more often than that of others. Congress should appropriate funds to pay
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counsels, but sufficient numbers likely could be found who would provide
their expertise as a public service.
The big question is what specifically these counsels would do. Put
simply, they would do what they are asked to do, and this would vary from
case to case and from personality to personality. A counsel could be brought
in at the time certiorari is considered. At that point an expert could give
advice on the question of whether certiorari should be granted (based on
expertise rather than social policy, upon which the Justices should need no
advice). A counsel could be brought in to answer questions, in writing or
orally, before the Justices take their preliminary vote on a case, with or
without reading the briefs and listening to a tape of the oral arguments, as the
Justices chose. A counsel could be made available to the Justices and their
clerks for informal advice on all manner of subjects, from how to frame the
issues in a decision to a suggestion simply of what books to consult. A
counsel could be asked to review a draft opinion or even to write a draft.
Obviously, the least change in the current workings of the Court would be
simply to have a counsel review a draft opinion. If only that had been done
in Gustafson, for example, a great mess could easily have been avoided.
NOTES

